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Abstract
We study infinite stochastic games played by two players over a finite state space, with objectives specified by sets of infinite
traces. The games are concurrent (players make moves simultaneously and independently), stochastic (the next state is determined
by a probability distribution that depends on the current state and chosen moves of the players) and infinite (proceed for an infinite
number of rounds). The analysis of concurrent stochastic games can be classified into: quantitative analysis, analyzing the optimum
value of the game and ε-optimal strategies that ensure values within ε of the optimum value; and qualitative analysis, analyzing the
set of states with optimum value 1 and ε-optimal strategies for the states with optimum value 1. We consider concurrent games with
tail objectives, i.e., objectives that are independent of the finite-prefix of traces, and show that the class of tail objectives is strictly
richer than that of the ω-regular objectives. We develop new proof techniques to extend several properties of concurrent games
with ω-regular objectives to concurrent games with tail objectives. We prove the positive limit-one property for tail objectives. The
positive limit-one property states that for all concurrent games if the optimum value for a player is positive for a tail objective Φ
at some state, then there is a state where the optimum value is 1 for the player for the objective Φ. We also show that the optimum
values of zero-sum (strictly conflicting objectives) games with tail objectives can be related to equilibrium values of nonzero-
sum (not strictly conflicting objectives) games with simpler reachability objectives. A consequence of our analysis presents a
polynomial time reduction of the quantitative analysis of tail objectives to the qualitative analysis for the subclass of one-player
stochastic games (Markov decision processes).
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Stochastic games. Non-cooperative games provide a natural framework to model interactions between agents [13].
A wide class of games progress over time and in stateful manner, and the current game depends on the history of
interactions. Infinite stochastic games [14,9] are a natural model for such dynamic games. A stochastic game is
played over a finite state space and is played in rounds. In concurrent games, in each round, each player chooses an
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action from a finite set of available actions, simultaneously and independently of the other player. The game proceeds
to a new state according to a probabilistic transition relation (stochastic transition matrix) based on the current state
and the joint actions of the players. Concurrent games (also known as Blackwell games) subsume the simpler class of
turn-based games, where at every state at most one player can choose between multiple actions; and Markov decision
processes (MDPs), where only one player can choose between multiple actions at every state. Concurrent games also
provide the framework to model synchronous reactive systems [6]. In verification and control of finite state reactive
systems such games proceed for an infinite number of rounds, generating an infinite sequence of states, called the
outcome of the game. The players receive a payoff based on a payoff function that maps every outcome to a real
number.
Objectives. Payoffs are generally Borel measurable functions [12]. That is, the payoff set for each player is a Borel
set Bi in the Cantor topology on Sω (where S is the set of states), and player i gets payoff 1 if the outcome of the game
is a member of Bi , and 0 otherwise. In verification, payoff functions are usually index sets of ω-regular languages.
The ω-regular languages generalize the classical regular languages to infinite strings, they occur in low levels of the
Borel hierarchy (they are in Σ03 ∩Π03), and they form a robust and expressive language for determining payoffs for
commonly used specifications. The simplest ω-regular objectives correspond to safety (“closed sets”) and reachability
(“open sets”) objectives.
Zero-sum games, determinacy and nonzero-sum games. Games may be zero-sum, where two players have directly
conflicting objectives and the payoff of one player is one minus the payoff of the other, or nonzero-sum, where each
player has a prescribed payoff function based on the outcome of the game. The fundamental question for games is the
existence of equilibrium values. For zero-sum games, this involves showing a determinacy theorem that states that the
expected optimum value obtained by player 1 is exactly one minus the expected optimum value obtained by player 2.
For one-step zero-sum games, this is von Neumann’s minmax theorem [16]. For infinite games, the existence of such
equilibria is not obvious, in fact, by using the axiom of choice, one can construct games for which determinacy does
not hold. However, a remarkable result by Martin [12] shows that all stochastic zero-sum games with Borel payoffs
are determined. For nonzero-sum games, the fundamental equilibrium concept is a Nash equilibrium [10], that is, a
strategy profile such that no player can gain by deviating from the profile, assuming the other player continues playing
the strategy in the profile.
Qualitative and quantitative analysis. The analysis of zero-sum concurrent games can be broadly classified into:
(a) quantitative analysis and (b) qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis involves the analysis of the optimum
values of the games and ε-optimal strategies that ensure values within ε of the optimum value. The qualitative analysis
involves the simpler analysis of the set of states where the optimum value is 1, and ε-limit-sure winning strategies
that ensure satisfying the objective with value at least 1 − ε. In general, the qualitative analysis of concurrent games
is simpler as compared to quantitative analysis, as it only considers the case when the value is 1. Optimum values in
concurrent games can be irrational even for reachability and safety objectives (with all rational transition probabilities)
and hence quantitative analysis requires more involved analysis.
Properties of concurrent games. The result of Martin [12] established the determinacy of zero-sum concurrent
games for all Borel objectives. The determinacy result sets forth the problem of study and closer understanding of
properties and behaviors of concurrent games with different class of objectives. Several interesting questions related
to concurrent games are: (1) characterizing certain zero–one laws for concurrent games; (2) relationship of qualitative
and quantitative analysis; (3) relationship of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. The results of [6,7,2] exhibited several
interesting properties for concurrent games with ω-regular objectives specified as parity objectives. The result of [6]
showed the positive limit-one property, that states if there is a state with positive optimum value, then there is a state
with optimum value 1, for concurrent games with parity objectives. The positive limit-one property has been a key
property to develop algorithms and improved complexity bound for quantitative analysis of concurrent games with
parity objectives [2]. The above properties can possibly be the basic ingredients for the computational complexity
analysis of quantitative analysis of concurrent games.
Outline of results. In this work, we consider tail objectives, the objectives that do not depend on any finite-prefix
of the traces. Tail objectives subsume canonical ω-regular objectives such as parity objectives and Muller objectives,
and we show that there exist tail objectives that cannot be expressed as ω-regular objectives. Hence the class of tail
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objectives is a strictly richer class of objectives than ω-regular objectives. Our result characterizes several properties
of concurrent games with tail objectives. The results are as follows.
1. We show the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with tail objectives. Our result thus extends the result
of [6] from parity objectives to a richer class of objectives that lies in the higher levels of Borel hierarchy. The
result of [6] follows from a complementation argument of quantitative µ-calculus formula. Our proof technique
is completely different: it uses certain strategy construction procedures and a convergence result from measure
theory (Le´vy’s zero–one law). It may be noted that the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with
Muller objectives follows from the positive limit-one property for parity objectives and the reduction of Muller
objectives to parity objectives [15]. Since Muller objectives are tail objectives, our result presents a direct proof for
the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with Muller objectives.
2. We relate the optimum values of zero-sum games with tail objectives with Nash equilibrium values of nonzero-
sum games with reachability objectives. This establishes a relationship between the values of concurrent games
with complex tail objectives and Nash equilibrium of nonzero-sum games with simpler objectives. From the above
analysis we obtain a polynomial time reduction of quantitative analysis of tail objectives to qualitative analysis for
the special case of MDPs. The above result was previously known for the subclass of ω-regular objectives specified
as Muller objectives [4,5,1]. The proof techniques of [4,5,1] use different analysis of the structure of MDPs and is
completely different from our proof techniques.
3. We also present construction of witnesses of ε-optimal strategies as witnesses of certain limit-sure winning
strategies that respect some local conditions, for all Muller objectives.
2. Definitions
Notation. For a countable set A, a probability distribution on A is a function δ : A → [0, 1] such that∑a∈A δ(a) = 1.
We denote the set of probability distributions on A by D(A). Given a distribution δ ∈ D(A), we denote by
Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the support of δ.
Definition 1 (Concurrent Games). A (two-player) concurrent game structure G = 〈S,Moves,Mv1,Mv2, δ〉 consists
of the following components:
• A finite state space S and a finite set Moves of moves.
• Two move assignmentsMv1,Mv2 : S → 2Moves \∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignmentMvi associates with each state s ∈ S
the non-empty set Mvi (s) ⊆ Moves of moves available to player i at s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ : S ×Moves×Moves → D(S), that gives the probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t) of a
transition from s to t when player 1 plays move a1 and player 2 plays move a2, for all s, t ∈ S and a1 ∈ Mv1(s),
a2 ∈ Mv2(s). 
An important special class of concurrent games is Markov decision processes (MDPs), where at every state s we have
|Mv2(s)| = 1, i.e., the set of available moves for player 2 is singleton at every state.
At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move a1 ∈ Mv1(s), and simultaneously and independently player 2
chooses a move a2 ∈ Mv2(s). The game then proceeds to the successor state t with probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t), for all
t ∈ S. A state s is called an absorbing state if for all a1 ∈ Mv1(s) and a2 ∈ Mv2(s) we have δ(s, a1, a2)(s) = 1.
In other words, at s for all choices of moves of the players the next state is always s. We assume that the players act
non-cooperatively, i.e., each player chooses her strategy independently and secretly from the other player, and is only
interested in maximizing her own reward.
A path or a play ω of G is an infinite sequence ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 of states in S such that for all k ≥ 0, there are
moves ak1 ∈ Mv1(sk) and ak2 ∈ Mv2(sk) with δ(sk, ak1, ak2)(sk+1) > 0. We denote by Ω the set of all paths and by Ωs
the set of all paths ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 such that s0 = s, i.e., the set of plays starting from state s.
Strategies. A selector ξ for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function ξ : S → D(Moves) such that for all s ∈ S and a ∈ Moves,
if ξ(s)(a) > 0, then a ∈ Mvi (s). We denote by Λi the set of all selectors for player i ∈ {1, 2}. A strategy for player 1
is a function σ : S+ → Λ1 that associates with every finite non-empty sequence of states, representing the history
of the play so far, a selector, i.e., for all w ∈ S∗ and s ∈ S we have Supp(σ (w · s)) ⊆ Mv1(s). Similarly we define
strategies pi for player 2. We denote by Σ and Π the set of all strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
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Once the starting state s and the strategies σ and pi for the two players have been chosen, the game is reduced to
an ordinary stochastic process. Hence the probabilities of events are uniquely defined, where an event A ⊆ Ωs is a
measurable set of paths. For an event A ⊆ Ωs we denote by Prσ,pis (A) the probability that a path belongs to A when
the game starts from s and the players follows the strategies σ and pi , and for a measurable function f : Ω → R we
denote by Eσ,pis [ f ] the expectation of the function f under the probability distribution Prσ,pis (·). For i ≥ 0, we also
denote by Θi : Ω → S the random variable denoting the i-th state along a path.
Objectives. We specify objectives for the players by providing the set of winning plays Φ ⊆ Ω for each player. Given
an objective Φ we denote by Φ = Ω \Φ, the complementary objective of Φ. A concurrent game with objective Φ1 for
player 1 andΦ2 for player 2 is zero-sum ifΦ2 = Φ1. A general class of objectives are the Borel objectives [11]. A Borel
objective Φ ⊆ Sω is a Borel set in the Cantor topology on Sω. In this paper we consider ω-regular objectives [15],
which lie in the first 21/2 levels of the Borel hierarchy (i.e., in the intersection of Σ03 and Π
0
3) and tail objectives
which is a strict superset of ω-regular objectives. The ω-regular objectives, and subclasses thereof, and tail objectives
are defined below. For a play ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 ∈ Ω , we define Inf(ω) = {s ∈ S | sk = s for infinitely many k ≥ 0}
to be the set of states that occur infinitely often in ω.
• Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set T ⊆ S of “target” states, the reachability objective requires that
some state of T be visited. The set of winning plays is thus Reach(T ) = {ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 ∈ Ω | sk ∈
T for some k ≥ 0}. Given a set F ⊆ S, the safety objective requires that only states of F be visited. Thus, the set
of winning plays is Safe(F) = {ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 ∈ Ω | sk ∈ F for all k ≥ 0}.
• Bu¨chi and coBu¨chi objectives. Given a set B ⊆ S of “Bu¨chi” states, the Bu¨chi objective requires that B is visited
infinitely often. Formally, the set of winning plays is Bu¨chi(B) = {ω ∈ Ω | Inf(ω) ∩ B 6= ∅}. Given C ⊆ S,
the coBu¨chi objective requires that all states visited infinitely often are in C . Formally, the set of winning plays is
coBu¨chi(C) = {ω ∈ Ω | Inf(ω) ⊆ C}.
• Parity objectives. For c, d ∈ N, we let [c..d] = {c, c + 1, . . . , d}. Let p : S → [0..d] be a function that assigns
a priority p(s) to every state s ∈ S, where d ∈ N. The Even parity objective is defined as Parity(p) = {ω ∈ Ω |
min(p(Inf(ω))) is even}, and the Odd parity objective as coParity(p) = {ω ∈ Ω | min(p(Inf(ω))) is odd}.
• Muller objectives. Given a setM ⊆ 2S of subset of states, the Muller objective is defined as Muller(M) = {ω ∈
Ω | Inf(ω) ∈M}.
• Tail objectives. Informally the class of tail objectives is the subclass of Borel objectives that are independent of all
finite-prefixes. An objective Φ is a tail objective, if the following condition hold: a path ω ∈ Φ if and only if for all
i ≥ 0, ωi ∈ Φ, where ωi denotes the path ω with the prefix of length i deleted. Formally, let Gi = σ (Θi ,Θi+1, . . .)
be the σ -field generated by the random variables Θi ,Θi+1, . . . .1 The tail σ -field T is defined as T = ⋂i≥0 Gi .
An objective Φ is a tail objective if and only if Φ belongs to the tail σ -field T , i.e., the tail objectives are indicator
functions of events A ∈ T .
The Muller and parity objectives are canonical forms to represent ω-regular objectives [15]. Observe that Muller
and parity objectives are tail objectives. Note that for a priority function p : S → {0, 1}, an even parity objective
Parity(p) is equivalent to the Bu¨chi objective Bu¨chi(p−1(0)), i.e., the Bu¨chi set consists of the states with priority 0.
Bu¨chi and coBu¨chi objectives are special cases of parity objectives. Reachability objectives are not necessarily
tail objectives, but for a set T ⊆ S of states, if every state s ∈ T is an absorbing state, then the objective
Reach(T ) is equivalent to Bu¨chi(T ) and hence is a tail objective. It may be noted that since σ -fields are closed
under complementation, the class of tail objectives are closed under complementation. We give an example to show
that the class of tail objectives is richer than that of ω-regular objectives.2
Example 1. Let r be a reward function that maps every state s to a real-valued reward r(s), i.e., r : S → R. For a
constant c ∈ R, consider the objective Φc defined as follows:
Φc =
{
ω ∈ Ω | ω = 〈s1, s2, s3, . . .〉, lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
r(si ) ≥ c
}
.
1 We use σ for strategies and σ (boldface) for sigma-fields.
2 Our example shows that there areΠ03-hard objectives that are tail objectives. It is possible that the tail objectives can express objectives in even
higher levels of Borel hierarchy thanΠ03, which would make our results stronger.
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Intuitively,Φc accepts the set of paths such that the “long-run” average of the rewards in the path is at least the constant
c. The “long-run” average condition is hard for the third level of the Borel hierarchy (i.e.,Π03-hard (see Section 2.1 for
Π03-hardness proof)) and cannot be expressed as an ω-regular objective. It may be noted that the “long-run” average
of a path is independent of all finite-prefixes of the path. Formally, the objectives Φc are tail objectives. Since Φc are
Π03-hard objectives, it follows that tail objectives lie in higher levels of Borel hierarchy than ω-regular objectives. 
Values. The probability that a path satisfies an objective Φ starting from state s ∈ S, given strategies σ, pi for the
players is Prσ,pis (Φ). Given a state s ∈ S and an objective Φ, we are interested in the maximal probability with which
player 1 can ensure that Φ and player 2 can ensure that Φ holds from s. We call such probability the value of the game
G at s for player i ∈ {1, 2}. The value for player 1 and player 2 are given by the functions 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ) : S → [0, 1]
and 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ) : S → [0, 1], defined for all s ∈ S by 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = supσ∈Σ infpi∈Π Prσ,pis (Φ) and 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) =
suppi∈Π infσ∈Σ Prσ,pis (Φ). Note that the objectives of the player are complementary and hence we have a zero-sum
game. Concurrent games satisfy a quantitative version of determinacy [12], stating that for all Borel objectives Φ and
all s ∈ S, we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) + 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 1. A strategy σ for player 1 is optimal for objective Φ if for all
s ∈ S we have infpi∈Π Prσ,pis (Φ) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s). For ε > 0, a strategy σ for player 1 is ε-optimal for objective Φ if
for all s ∈ S we have infpi∈Π Prσ,pis (Φ) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) − ε. We define optimal and ε-optimal strategies for player 2
symmetrically. For ε > 0, an objective Φ for player 1 and Φ for player 2, we denote by Σε(Φ) and Πε(Φ) the set
of ε-optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Even in concurrent games with reachability objectives
optimal strategies need not exist [6], and ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0, is the best one can achieve. Note that the
quantitative determinacy of concurrent games is equivalent to the existence of ε-optimal strategies for objective Φ for
player 1 and Φ for player 2, for all ε > 0, at all states s ∈ S, i.e., for all ε > 0, Σε(Φ) 6= ∅ and Πε(Φ) 6= ∅.
We refer to the analysis of computing the limit-sure winning states (the set of states s such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 1)
and ε-limit-sure winning strategies (ε-optimal strategies for the limit-sure winning states) as the qualitative analysis of
objective Φ. We refer to the analysis of computing the values and the ε-optimal strategies as the quantitative analysis
of objective Φ.
Notation for qualitative sets. We use the following notation for the qualitative sets for the rest of the paper:
W 11 = {s | 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 1}; W 12 = {s | 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 1}.
W>01 = {s | 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0}; W>02 = {s | 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0}.
By determinacy of concurrent games with tail objectives, we have W 11 = S \W>02 and W 12 = S \W>01 .
2.1. Hardness of lim inf objectives
Borel hierarchy. For an (possibly infinite) alphabet A, let Aω and A∗ denote the set of infinite and finite words on A,
respectively. The finite Borel hierarchy (Σ01,Π
0
1), (Σ
0
2,Π
0
2), (Σ
0
3,Π
0
3), . . . is defined as follows:
• Σ01 = {W · Aω | W ⊆ A∗} is the set of open sets;
• for all n ≥ 1,Π0n = {Aω \ L | L ∈ Σ0n} consists of the complement of sets in Σ0n ;
• for all n ≥ 1, Σ0n+1 = {
⋃
i∈N L i | ∀i ∈ N. L i ∈ Π0n} is the set obtained by countable union of sets inΠ0n .
Definition 2 (Wadge Game). Let A and B be two (possibly infinite) alphabets. Let X ⊆ Aω and Y ⊆ Bω. The Wadge
game GW (X, Y ) is a two-player game between player 1 and player 2 as follows. Player 1 first chooses a letter a0 ∈ A
and then player 2 chooses a (possibly empty) finite word b0 ∈ B∗, then player 1 chooses a letter a1 ∈ A and then
player 2 chooses a word b1 ∈ B∗, and so on. The play consists in writing a word wX = a0a1 . . . by player 1 and
wY = b0b1 . . . by player 2. Player 2 wins if and only if both wY is infinite and wX ∈ X iff wY ∈ Y .
Definition 3 (Wadge Reduction). Given alphabets A and B, a set X ⊆ Aω is Wadge reducible to a set Y ⊆ Bω,
denoted as X ≤W Y , if and only if there exists a continuous function f : Aω → Bω such that X = f −1(Y ). If
X ≤W Y and Y ≤W X , then X and Y are Wadge equivalent and we denote this by X ≡W Y .
The notion of strategies in Wadge games and winners are defined similarly to the notion of games on graphs. The
Wadge games and Wadge reduction are related by the following result.
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Proposition 1 ([17]). Player 2 has a winning strategy in the Wadge game GW (X, Y ) iff X ≤W Y .
Wadge equivalence preserves Borel hierarchy and defines the natural notion of completeness.
Proposition 2. If X ≡W Y , then X and Y belong to the same level of Borel hierarchy.
Definition 4. A set Y ∈ Σ0n (resp. Y ∈ Π0n) is Σ0n-complete (resp. Π0n-complete) if and only if X ≤W Y for all
X ∈ Σ0n (resp. X ∈ Π0n).
Our goal is to show that the lim inf objectives (defined in Example 1) areΠ03-hard. We first present some notation.
Notation. Let A be an alphabet and B = {b0, b1}. For a word w ∈ A∗ or w ∈ B∗ we denote by len(w) the length of
w. For an infinite word w or finite word w with len(w) ≥ k we denote by (w  k) the prefix of length k of w. For a
word w ∈ Bω or w ∈ B∗ with len(w) ≥ k, we denote by
avg(w  k) = number of b0 in (w  k)
k
,
i.e., the average of b0’s in (w  k). For a finite word w we denote by avg(w) = avg(w  len(w)). Let
Y =
{
w ∈ Bω | lim inf
k→∞avg(w  k) = 1
}
=
⋂
i≥0
⋃
j≥0
⋂
k≥ j
{
w ∈ Bω | avg(w  k) ≥ 1− 1
i
}
.
Hardness of Y . We will show that Y isΠ03-hard. To prove the result we consider an arbitrary X ∈ Π03 and show that
X ≤W Y . A set X ⊆ Aω inΠ03 is obtained as the countable intersection of countable union of closed sets, i.e.,
X =
⋂
i≥0
⋃
j≥0
(A j · (Fi j )ω),
where Fi j ⊆ A, and A j denotes the set of words of length j in A∗. We show such a X is Wadge reducible to Y , by
showing that player 2 has a winning strategy in GW (X, Y ). In the reduction we will use the following notation: given
a word w ∈ A∗, let
sat(w) = {i | ∃ j ≥ 0. w ∈ A j · (Fi j )∗};
d(w) = max{l | ∀l ′ ≤ l. l ′ ∈ sat(w)} + 1.
For example if sat(w) = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7}, then d(w) = max{0, 1, 2}+1 = 3. The play between player 1 and player 2
proceeds as follows:
Player 1: wX = a1 a2 a3 . . . ; ∀i ≥ 1. ai ∈ A
Player 2: wY = wY (1) wY (2) wY (3) . . . ; ∀i ≥ 1. wY (i) ∈ B+.
A winning strategy for player 2 is as follows: let the current prefix of wX of length k be (wX  k) = a1a2 . . . ak and
the current prefix of wY be wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY (k − 1), then the word wY (k) is generated satisfying the following
conditions.
1. (Condition 1.) There exists ` ≤ len(wY (k)) such that
avg(wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY (k − 1)(wY (k)  `)) ≥ 1− 1d(wX  k) ,
for all `1 ≤ `
avg(wY (1) . . . wY (k − 1)(wY (k)  `)) ≥ avg(wY (1) . . . wY (k − 1)(wY (k)  `1))
and for all `2 such that ` ≤ `2 ≤ len(wY (k)) we have
avg(wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY (k − 1)(wY (k)  `2)) ≥ 1− 1d(wX  k) .
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2. (Condition 2.)
1− 1
d(wX  k)
≤ avg(wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY (k)) ≤ 1− 1d(wX  k)+ 1 .
Intuitively, player 2 plays as follows: (a) initially player 2 plays a sequence of b0’s to ensure that the average
of b0’s crosses (1 − 1d(wX k) ), and (b) then plays a sequence of b0 and b1’s to ensure that the average of b0 in
wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY (k) is in the interval[
1− 1
d(wX  k)
, 1− 1
d(wX  k)+ 1
]
,
and the average never falls below (1− 1d(wX k) )while generatingwY (k) once it crosses (1− 1d(wX k) ). Clearly, player 2
has such a strategy. Given a word wX ∈ Aω, the corresponding word wY generated is an infinite word. Hence we need
to prove wX ∈ X if and only if wY ∈ Y . We prove implications in both directions.
Claim 1 (wX ∈ X ⇒ wY ∈ Y ). Let wX ∈ X and we show that wY ∈ Y . Given wX ∈ X, we have ∀i ≥ 0. ∃ j ≥
0. wX ∈ A j · (Fi j )ω. Given i ≥ 0, let
j (i) = min{ j ≥ 0 | wX ∈ A j · (Fi j )ω}; ĵ(i) = max{ j (i ′) | i ′ ≤ i}.
Given i ≥ 0, for j = ĵ(i), for all k ≥ j we have (wX  k) ∈ A j · (Fi j )∗. Consider the sequence (wX  j), (wX 
j +1), . . . : for all k ≥ j we have {i ′ | i ′ ≤ i} ⊆ sat(wX  k). Hence in the corresponding sequence of the word wY it
is ensured that for all ` ≥ len(wY (1)wY (2) . . . wY ( j)) we have avg(wY  `) ≥ 1− 1i+1 . Hence lim infn→∞ avg(wY 
n) ≥ 1− 1i+1 . Since this holds for all i ≥ 0, let i →∞ to obtain that lim infn→∞ avg(wY  n) ≥ 1 = 1 (the equality
follows as the average can never be more than 1). Hence wY ∈ Y .
Claim 2 (wY ∈ Y ⇒ wX ∈ X ). Let wY ∈ Y and we show wX ∈ X. Fix i ≥ 0. Since lim infn→∞ avg(wY  n) = 1,
it follows that from some point on average never falls below 1 − 1i+1 . Then there exists j such that for all l ≥ j we
have d(wX  l) ≥ i + 1 and hence {i ′ | i ′ ≤ i} ⊆ sat(wY  l). Hence for all l ≥ j we have (wX  l) ∈ A j · (Fi j )∗
and thus we obtain that wX ∈ A j · (Fi j )ω, i.e., ∃ j ≥ 0 such that wX ∈ A j · (Fi j )ω. Since this holds for all i ≥ 0, it
follows that wX ∈ X.
From Claims 1 and 2 it follows that Y is Π03-hard, and as an easy consequence we have that the objectives Φc
defined in Example 1 isΠ03-hard. Hence tail objectives containΠ
0
3-hard objectives and since tail objectives are closed
under complementation it also follows that tail objectives contain Σ03-hard objectives.
3. Positive limit-one property
The positive limit-one property for concurrent games, for a class C of objectives, states that for all objectivesΦ ∈ C,
for all concurrent games G, if there is a state s such that the value for player 1 is positive at s for Φ, then there is
a state s′ where the value for player 1 is 1 for Φ. The property means if a player can win with positive value from
some state, then from some state she can win with value 1. The positive limit-one property was proved for parity
objectives in [6] and has been one of the key properties used in the algorithmic analysis of concurrent games with
parity objectives [2]. In this section we prove the positive limit-one property for concurrent games with tail objectives,
and thereby extend the positive limit-one property from parity objectives to a richer class of objectives that subsumes
several canonical ω-regular objectives. Our proof uses a result from measure theory and certain strategy constructions,
whereas the proof for the subclass of parity objectives [6] followed from complementation arguments of quantitative
µ-calculus formulas. We first show an example that the positive limit-one property is not true for all objectives, even
for simpler class of games.
Example 2. Consider the game shown in Fig. 1, where at every state s, we have Mv1(s) = Mv2(s) = {1} (i.e., the
set of moves is singleton at all states). From all states the next state is s0 and s1 with equal probability. Consider the
objective©(s1) which specifies the next state is s1; i.e., a play ω starting from state s is winning if the first state of the
play is s and the second state (or the next state from s) in the play is s1. Given the objective Φ = ©(s1) for player 1,
we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s0) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s1) = 1/2. Hence though the value is positive at s0, there is no state with value 1
for player 1. 
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Fig. 1. A simple Markov chain.
Notation. In the setting of concurrent games the natural filtration sequence (Fn) for the stochastic process under any
pair of strategies is defined as
Fn = σ (Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θn)
i.e., the σ -field generated by the random variables Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θn .
Conditional expectations. Given a σ -algebra H, the conditional expectation E[ f | H] of a measurable function f
is a random variable Z that satisfies the following properties: (a) Z is H measurable and (b) for all A ∈ H we have
E[ f 1A] = E[Z1A], where 1A is the indicator of event A (see [8] for details). Another key property of conditional
expectation is as follows: E[E[ f | H]] = E[ f ] (again see [8] for details).
Almost-sure convergence. Given a random variable X and a sequence (Xn)n≥0 of random variables we write
Xn → X almost-surely if limn→∞ Pr({ω | Xn(ω) = X (ω)}) = 1, i.e., with probability 1 the sequence converges to
X .
Lemma 1 (Le´vy’s 0–1 Law). Suppose Hn ↑ H∞, i.e.,Hn is a sequence of increasing σ -fields and H∞ = σ (∪nHn).
For all events A ∈ H∞ we have
E[1A | Hn] = Pr(A | Hn)→ 1A almost-surely, (i.e., with probability 1),
where 1A is the indicator function of event A.
The proof of the lemma is available in the book of Durrett (page 262–263) [8]. An immediate consequence of Lemma 1
in the setting of concurrent games is the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (0–1 Law in Concurrent Games). For all concurrent game structures G, for all events A ∈ F∞ =
σ (∪nFn), for all strategies (σ, pi) ∈ Σ ×Π , for all states s ∈ S, we have
Prσ,pis (A | Fn)→ 1A almost-surely.
Intuitively, the lemma means that the probability Prσ,pis (A | Fn) converges almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1) to 0
or 1 (since indicator functions take values in the range {0, 1}). Note that the tail σ -field T is a subset of F∞, i.e.,
T ⊆ F∞, and hence the result of Lemma 2 holds for all A ∈ T .
Objectives as indicator functions. Objectives Φ are indicator functions Φ : Ω → {0, 1} defined as follows:
Φ(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ Φ
0 otherwise.
Notation. Given strategies σ and pi for player 1 and player 2, a tail objective Φ, and a state s, for β > 0, let
H1,βn (σ, pi,Φ) = {〈s1, s2, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . .〉 | Prσ,pis (Φ | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) ≥ 1− β}
= {ω | Prσ,pis (Φ | Fn)(ω) ≥ 1− β};
denote the set of paths ω such that the probability of satisfying Φ given the strategies σ and pi , and the prefix of length
n of ω is at least 1− β. Similarly, let
H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ) = {〈s1, s2, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . .〉 | Prσ,pis (Φ | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) ≤ β}
= {ω | Prσ,pis (Φ | Fn)(ω) ≤ β};
denote the set of paths ω such that the probability of satisfying Φ given the strategies σ and pi , and the prefix of length
n of ω is at most β. We often refer to prefixes of paths in H1,βn as histories in H
1,β
n , and analogously for H
0,β
n .
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Proposition 3. For all concurrent game structures G, for all strategies σ and pi for player 1 and player 2,
respectively, for all tail objectives Φ, for all states s ∈ S, for all β > 0 and ε > 0, there exists n, such that
Prσ,pis (H
1,β
n (σ, pi,Φ) ∪ H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ)) ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Let fn = Prσ,pis (Φ | Fn). By Lemma 2, we have fn → Φ almost-surely as n → ∞. Since almost-sure
convergence implies convergence in probability we have
∀β > 0. limn→∞ Prσ,pis ({ω | | fn(ω)− Φ(ω)| ≥ β}) = 0
⇒ ∀β > 0. lim
n→∞ Pr
σ,pi
s ({ω | | fn(ω)− Φ(ω)| ≤ β}) = 1.
Since Φ is an indicator function we have
∀β > 0. limn→∞ Prσ,pis ({ω | fn(ω) ≥ 1− β or fn(ω) ≤ β}) = 1
⇒ ∀β > 0. lim
n→∞ Pr
σ,pi
s (H
1,β
n (σ, pi,Φ) ∪ H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ)) = 1.
Hence we have
∀β > 0. ∀ε > 0. ∃n0. ∀n ≥ n0. Prσ,pis (H1,βn (σ, pi,Φ) ∪ H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ)) ≥ 1− ε.
The result follows. 
Lemma 3 (Always-Positive Implies Probability 1). Let α > 0 be a real constant greater than 0. For all objectives Φ,
for all strategies σ and pi , and for all states s, if
fn = Prσ,pis (Φ | Fn) > α, ∀n, i.e., fn(ω) > α almost-surely for all n;
then Prσ,pis (Φ) = 1.
Proof. We show that for all ε > 0 we have Prσ,pis (Φ) ≥ 1 − 2ε. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, the result follows. Given
ε > 0 and α > 0, we chose β such that 0 < β < α and 0 < β < ε. By Proposition 3 there exists a n0 such that for all
n > n0 we have
Prσ,pis ({ω | fn(ω) ≥ 1− β or fn(ω) ≤ β}) ≥ 1− ε.
Since fn(ω) ≥ α > β almost-surely for all n, we have Prσ,pis ({ω | fn(ω) ≥ 1 − β}) ≥ 1 − ε, i.e., we have
Prσ,pis (Φ | Fn) ≥ 1− β with probability at least 1− ε. Hence we have
Prσ,pis (Φ) = Eσ,pis [Φ] = Eσ,pis [Eσ,pis [Φ | Fn]] ≥ (1− β) · (1− ε) ≥ 1− 2ε.
Observe that we have used the property of conditional expectation to infer that Eσ,pis [Φ] = Eσ,pis [Eσ,pis [Φ | Fn]]. The
desired result follows. 
Theorem 1 (Positive Limit-One Property). For all concurrent game structures G, for all tail objectives Φ, if there
exists a state s ∈ S such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0, then there exists a state s′ ∈ S such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) = 1.
The basic idea of the proof. We prove the desired result by contradiction. We assume towards contradiction that from
some state s we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = α > 0 and for all states s1 we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s1) ≤ η < 1. We fix ε-optimal
strategies σ and pi for player 1 and player 2, for sufficiently small ε > 0. By Proposition 3, for all 0 < β < 1,
there exists n such that Prσ,pis (H
1,β
n (σ, pi,Φ) ∪ H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ)) ≥ 1 − ε4 . The strategy pi is modified to a strategy p˜i
as follows: on histories in H0,βn (σ, pi,Φ), the strategy p˜i ignores the history of length n and switches to an ε4 -optimal
strategy, and otherwise plays as pi . By suitable choice of β (depending on ε) we show that player 2 can ensure that
the probability of satisfying Φ from s given σ is less than α − ε. This contradicts that σ is an ε-optimal strategy and
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = α. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 2. We formally prove the result now.
Proof (Of Theorem 1). Assume towards contradiction that there exists a state s such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0, but for
all states s′ we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) < 1. Let α = 1 − 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s). Since 0 < 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) < 1,
we have 0 < α < 1. Since 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′) = 1 − 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) and for all states s′ we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) < 1, it
follows that 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′) > 0, for all states s′. Fix η such that 0 < η = mins′∈S〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′). Also observe that
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Fig. 2. An illustration of idea of Theorem 1.
since 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) = α < 1, we have η < 1. Let c be a constant such that c > 0, and α · (1 + c) = γ < 1 (such
a constant exists as α < 1). Also let c1 > 1 be a constant such that c1 · γ < 1 (such a constant exists since γ < 1).
Hence we have 1− c1 · γ > 0 and 1− 1c1 > 0. Fix ε > 0 and β > 0 such that
0 < 2ε < min
{η
4
, 2c · α, η
4
· (1− c1 · γ )
}
; β < min
{
ε,
1
2
, 1− 1
c1
}
. (1)
Fix ε-optimal strategies σε for player 1 and piε for player 2. Let H
1,β
n = H1,βn (σε, piε,Φ) and H0,βn = H0,βn (σε, piε,Φ).
Consider n such that Prσε,piεs (H
1,β
n ∪ H0,βn ) ≥ 1− ε4 (such a n exists by Proposition 3). Also observe that since β < 12
we have H1,βn ∩ H0,βn = ∅. Let
val = Prσε,piεs (Φ | H1,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H1,βn )+ Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ).
We have
val ≤ Prσε,piεs (Φ) ≤ val+
ε
4
. (2)
The first inequality follows since H1,βn ∩ H0,βn = ∅, and the second inequality follows since Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ∪ H0,βn ) ≥
1− ε4 . Since σε and piε are ε-optimal strategies we have α − ε ≤ Prσε,piεs (Φ) ≤ α + ε. This along with (2) yield that
α − ε − ε
4
≤ val ≤ α + ε. (3)
Observe that Prσε,piεs (Φ | H1,βn ) ≥ 1 − β and Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) ≤ β. Let q = Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ). Since Prσε,piεs (Φ |
H1,βn ) ≥ 1− β; by ignoring the term Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ) in val, and from the second inequality of (3),
we obtain that (1− β) · q ≤ α + ε. Since ε < c · α, β < 1− 1c1 , and γ = α · (1+ c), we have
q ≤ α + ε
1− β <
α · (1+ c)
1−
(
1− 1c1
) = c1 · γ (4)
We construct a strategy p̂iε as follows: the strategy p̂iε follows the strategy piε for the first n − 1-stages; if a history in
H1,βn is generated it follows piε, and otherwise it ignores the history and switches to an ε-optimal strategy. Formally,
for a history 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉 we have
p̂iε(〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉) =

piε(〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉) if k < n;
or Prσε,piεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) ≥ 1− β;
p˜iε(〈sn, . . . , sk〉) k ≥ n,Prσε,piεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) < 1− β,
where p˜iε is an ε-optimal strategy
Since p̂iε and piε coincide for n−1-stages we have Prσε,p̂iεs (H1,βn ) = Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ) and Prσε,p̂iεs (H0,βn ) = Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ).
Moreover, since Φ is a tail objective that is independent of the prefix of length n, η ≤ mins′∈S〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′), and p˜iε
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is an ε-optimal strategy, we have Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | H0,βn ) ≥ η − ε. Also observe that
Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | H0,βn ) ≥ (η − ε) = Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn )+ (η − ε − Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ))
≥ Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn )+ (η − ε − β), (5)
since Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) ≤ β. Hence we have the following inequality
Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ) ≥ Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | H1,βn ) · Prσε,p̂iεs (H1,βn ) + Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,p̂iεs (H0,βn )
= Prσε,piεs (Φ | H1,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ) + Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,p̂iεs (H0,βn )
≥ Prσε,piεs (Φ | H1,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ) + Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H0,βn )
+ (η − ε − β) · (1− q − ε4) (since Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ) ≥ 1− q − ε4)
= val+ (η − ε − β) · (1− q − ε4 )≥ α − ε − ε4 + (η − ε − β) ·
(
1− q − ε4
)
(recall first inequality of (3))
> α − ε − ε4 + (η − 2ε) ·
(
1− q − ε4
)
(since β < ε by (1))
> α − ε − ε4 + η2 ·
(
1− q − ε4
)
(since 2ε < η2 by (1))
> α − ε − ε4 + η2 · (1− c1 · γ )− η2 · ε4 (since q < c1 · γ by (4))
> α − ε − ε
4
+ 4ε − ε
8
(since 2ε < η4 · (1− c1 · γ ) by (1),
and η ≤ 1)
> α + ε.
The first equality follows since for histories in H1,βn , the strategies piε and p̂iε coincide; and the second inequality
uses (5). Hence we have Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ) > α + ε and Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ) < 1 − α − ε. This is a contradiction to the fact that
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 1− α and σε is an ε-optimal strategy. The desired result follows. 
Recall that by determinacy of concurrent games with tail objectives, we have W 11 = S \W>02 and W 12 = S \W>01 .
We now present a finer characterization of the qualitative sets.
Corollary 1. For all concurrent game structures G, with tail objectives Φ for player 1, the following assertions hold:
1. (a) if W>01 6= ∅, then W 11 6= ∅; and (b) if W>02 6= ∅, then W 12 6= ∅.
2. (a) if W>01 = S, then W 11 = S; and (b) if W>02 = S, then W 12 = S.
Proof. The first result is a direct consequence of Theorem 1. The second result is derived as follows: if W>01 = S,
then by determinacy we have W 12 = ∅. If W 12 = ∅, it follows from part 1 that W>02 = ∅, and hence W 11 = S. The
result of part 2 shows that if a player has positive optimum value at every state, then the optimum value is 1 at all
states. 
Extension to countable state space. We first present an example to show that Corollary 1 (and hence also Theorem 1)
does not extend directly to concurrent games with countable state space. Then we present the appropriate extension
of Theorem 1 to concurrent games with countable state space.
Example 3. Consider a concurrent game defined on a countable state space S as follows: S = SN ∪ {t}, where
SN = {si | i = 0, 1, 2, . . .}. For every state s ∈ S we have Mv1(s) = Mv2(s) = {1}. The transition probabilities are
specified as follows: the state t is an absorbing state; and from state si the next state is si+1 with probability ( 12 )
1
2i ,
and the next state is t with the rest of the probability. Consider the tail objective Φ = Bu¨chi({t}). For a state si we
have 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(si ) = ( 12 )
∑∞
j=i 12 j = ( 12 )
1
2i−1 < 1. That is, we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0, for all s ∈ S. Hence W>01 = S,
however, W 11 6= S. It follows that Corollary 1 does not extend to concurrent games with countable state space. 
We now present the appropriate extension of Theorem 1 to countable state spaces.
Theorem 2. For all concurrent game structures G with countable state space, for all tail objectives Φ, if there exists
a state s ∈ S such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0, then sups′∈S〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) = 1.
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Proof. The key difference to the proof of Theorem 1 is to fix the constants. Assume towards contradiction that there
exists a state s such that 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) > 0, but sups′∈S〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) < 1. Let α = 1−〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s).
Since 0 < 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) < 1, we have 0 < α < 1. Let η = infs′∈S〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′). Since sups′∈S〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) < 1 and
〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s′) = 1 − 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s′) for all s′ ∈ S, we have 0 < η. Also observe that since 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s) = α < 1,
we have η < 1. Once the constant η is fixed, we can essentially follow the proof of Theorem 1 to obtain the desired
result. 
4. Zero-sum tail games to nonzero-sum reachability games
In this section we relate the values of zero-sum games with tail objectives with the Nash equilibrium values of
nonzero-sum games with reachability objectives. The result shows that the values of a zero-sum game with complex
objectives can be related to equilibrium values of a nonzero-sum game with simpler objectives. We also show that for
MDPs, the value function for a tail objectiveΦ can be computed by computing the maximal probability of reaching the
set of states with value 1. As an immediate consequence of the above analysis, we obtain a polynomial time reduction
of the quantitative analysis of MDPs with tail objectives to the qualitative analysis. We first prove a limit-reachability
property of ε-optimal strategies: the property states that for tail objectives, if the players play ε-optimal strategies, for
small ε > 0, then the game reaches W 11 ∪W 12 with high probability.
Theorem 3 (Limit-Reachability). For all concurrent game structures G, for all tail objectives Φ for player 1, for all
ε′ > 0, there exists ε > 0, such that for all states s ∈ S, for all ε-optimal strategies σε and piε, we have
Prσε,piεs (Reach(W
1
1 ∪W 12 )) ≥ 1− ε′.
Proof. By determinacy it follows thatW 11 ∪W 12 = S\(W>01 ∩W>02 ). For a state s ∈ W 11 ∪W 12 the result holds trivially.
Consider a state s ∈ W>01 ∩W>02 and let α = 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s). Observe that 0 < α < 1. Let η1 = mins∈W>02 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)
and η2 = maxs∈W>02 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s). Let η = min{η1, 1 − η2}, and note that 0 < η < 1. Given ε
′ > 0, fix ε such that
0 < 2ε < min{ η2 , η·ε
′
12 }. Fix any ε-optimal strategies σε and piε for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Fix β such
that 0 < β < ε and β < 12 . Let H
1,β
n = H1,βn (σε, piε,Φ) and H0,βn = H0,βn (σε, piε,Φ). Consider n such that
Prσε,piεs (H
1,β
n ∪ H0,βn ) = 1− ε4 (such a n exists by Proposition 3). As β < 12 , we have H1,βn ∩ H0,βn = ∅. Let us denote
by
val = Prσε,piεs (Φ | H1,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H1,βn )+ Prσε,piεs (Φ | H0,βn ) · Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ).
Similar to inequality (2) of Theorem 1 we obtain that
val ≤ Prσε,piεs (Φ) ≤ val+
ε
4
.
Since σε and piε are ε-optimal strategies, similar to inequality (3) of Theorem 1 we obtain that α−ε− ε4 ≤ val ≤ α+ε.
For W ⊆ S, let Reachn(W ) = {〈s1, s2, s3 . . .〉 | ∃k ≤ n. sk ∈ W } denote the set of paths that reach W in
n steps. We use the following notation: Reach(W 11 ) = Ω \ Reachn(W 11 ), and Reach(W 12 ) = Ω \ Reachn(W 12 ).
Consider a strategy σ̂ε defined as follows: for histories in H
1,β
n ∩ Reach(W 12 ), the strategy σ̂ε ignores the history
after stage n and follows an ε-optimal strategy σ˜ε (i.e., σ˜ε is an ε-optimal strategy); and for all other histories it
follows σε. Let z1 = Prσε,piεs (H1,βn ∩ Reach(W 12 )). Since η2 = maxs∈W>02 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s), player 1 switches to an
ε-optimal strategy for histories of length n in H1,βn ∩ Reach(W 12 ), and Φ is a tail objective, it follows that for all
ω = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . .〉 ∈ H1,βn ∩ Reach(W 12 ), we have Prσ̂ε,piεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2 . . . , sn〉) ≤ η2 + ε; where as
Prσε,piεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2 . . . , sn〉) ≥ 1− β. Hence we have
val2 = Prσ̂ε,piεs (Φ) ≤ Prσε,piεs (Φ)− z1 · (1− β − η2 − ε) ≤ val+
ε
4
− z1 · (1− β − η2 − ε),
since with probability z1 the decrease is at least by 1 − β − η2 − ε. Since piε is an ε-optimal strategy, we have
val2 ≥ α − ε. Since val ≤ α + ε, we have the following inequality
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z1 · (1− η2 − β − ε) ≤ 2ε + ε4 < 3ε
⇒ z1 < 3ε
η − β − ε (since η ≤ 1− η2)
⇒ z1 < 3ε
η − 2ε <
6ε
η
<
ε′
4
(
since β < ε; ε < η
4
; ε < η · ε
′
24
)
.
Consider a strategy p̂iε defined as follows: for histories in H
0,β
n ∩ Reach(W 11 ), the strategy p̂iε ignores the history
after stage n and follows an ε-optimal strategy p˜iε; and for all other histories it follows piε. Let z2 = Prσε,piεs (H0,βn ∩
Reach(W 11 )). Since η1 = mins∈W>02 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s), player 2 switches to an ε-optimal strategy for histories of length n in
H0,βn ∩Reach(W 11 ), andΦ is a tail objective, it follows that for all ω = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . .〉 ∈ H1,βn ∩Reach(W 11 ),
we have Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2 . . . , sn〉) ≥ η1 − ε; where as Prσε,piεs (Φ | 〈s1, s2 . . . , sn〉) ≤ β. Hence we have
val1 = Prσε,p̂iεs (Φ) ≥ Prσε,piεs (Φ)+ z2 · (η1 − ε − β) ≥ val+ z2 · (η1 − ε − β),
since with probability z2 the increase is at least by η1−ε−β. Since σε is an ε-optimal strategy, we have val1 ≤ α+ε.
Since val ≥ α − ε + ε4 , we have the following inequality
z2 · (η1 − β − ε) ≤ 2ε + ε4 < 3ε
⇒ z2 < 3ε
η − β − ε (since η ≤ η1)
⇒ z2 < ε
′
4
(
similar to the inequality for z1 <
ε′
4
)
.
Hence z1 + z2 ≤ ε′2 ; and then we have
Prσε,piεs (Reach(W
1
1 ∪W 12 )) ≥ Prσε,piεs (Reachn(W 11 ∪W 12 ) ∩ (H1,βn ∪ H0,βn ))
= Prσε,piεs (Reachn(W 11 ∪W 12 ) ∩ H1,βn )+ Prσε,piεs (Reachn(W 11 ∪W 12 ) ∩ H0,βn )
≥ Prσε,piεs (Reachn(W 11 ) ∩ H1,βn )+ Prσε,piεs (Reachn(W 12 ) ∩ H0,βn )
≥ Prσε,piεs (H1,βn )+ Prσε,piεs (H0,βn )− (z1 + z2)
≥ 1− ε
4
+ ε
′
2
≥ 1− ε′ (since ε ≤ ε′).
The result follows. 
Theorem 3 proves the limit-reachability property for tail objectives, under ε-optimal strategies, for small ε. We present
an example to show that Theorem 3 is not true for all objectives, or for tail objectives with arbitrary strategies.
Example 4. Observe that in the game shown in Example 2, the objective was not a tail objective and we had
W 11 ∪ W 12 = ∅. Hence Theorem 3 need not necessarily hold for all objectives. Also consider the game shown in
Fig. 3. In the game shown s1 and s2 are absorbing states. At s0 the available moves for the players are as follows:
Mv1(s0) = {a} and Mv2(s0) = {1, 2}. The transition function is as follows: if player 2 plays move 2, then the next
state is s1 and s2 with equal probability, and if player 2 plays move 1, then the next state is s0. The objective of player 1
is Φ = Bu¨chi({s0, s1}), i.e., to visit s0 or s1 infinitely often. We have W 11 = {s1} and W 12 = {s2}. Given a strategy
pi that chooses move 1 always, the set W 11 ∪ W 12 of states is reached with probability 0; however pi is not an optimal
or ε-optimal strategy for player 2 (for ε < 12 ). This shows that Theorem 3 need not hold if ε-optimal strategies are
not considered. In the game shown, for an optimal strategy for player 2 (e.g., a strategy to choose move 2) the play
reaches W 11 ∪W 12 with probability 1. 
The following example further illustrates Theorem 3.
Example 5 (Concurrent Bu¨chi Game). Consider the concurrent game shown in Fig. 4. The available moves for the
players at state s0 and s3 are {0, 1} and {0, 1, q}, respectively. At all other states the available moves for both the
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Fig. 3. A game with Bu¨chi objective.
Fig. 4. A concurrent Bu¨chi game.
players are singleton. The transitions are shown as labeled edges in the figure. The objective of player 1 is to visit s4
or s7 infinitely often, i.e., Bu¨chi({s4, s7}). The value for player 1 is 1 at state s7 and 0 at state s8. Observe that since
at state s3 each player can choose move q , it follows that the values for the players at state s3 (and hence at states
s0, s1, s2, s4, s5 and s6) is 1/2. Consider the strategy σ for player 1 as follows: (a) at state s0 it plays 0 and 1, each with
probability 1/2, and remembers the move played as the move b; (b) at state s3, player 1 remembers the move c played
by player 2 (since player 1 knows whether the state s1 or s2 was visited, it can infer the move played by player 2 at s0);
(c) at state s3 player 1 plays move b as long as player 2 plays move c, otherwise player 1 plays the move q . Informally,
player 1 plays both its move uniformly at random at s0, and discloses to player 2, and remembers the move of player 2.
As long as player 2 follows her move, player 1 follows her move chosen in the first round, else if player 2 deviates,
then player 1 quits the game by playing q . A strategy pi for player 2 can be defined similarly. Given strategies σ and
pi , and the starting state s0, the play reaches s7 and s8 with probability 0, and the play satisfies Bu¨chi({s4, s8}) with
probability 1/2. However, observe that the strategy σ is not an optimal strategy. Given the strategy σ , consider the
strategy pi as follows: the strategy pi chooses 0 and 1 with probability 1/2 at s0, and at s3 if the chosen move c at s0
matches with the move b for player 1, then player 2 plays q (i.e., quits the game) and otherwise it follows pi . Given
the strategy pi , if player 1 follows σ , then Bu¨chi({s4, s7}) is satisfied with only probability 14 . In the game shown, if
both the players follow any pair of optimal strategies, then the game reaches s7 and s8 with probability 1. 
Lemma 4 is immediate from Theorem 3.
Lemma 4. For all concurrent game structures G, for all tail objectives Φ for player 1 and Φ for player 2, for all
states s ∈ S, we have
lim
ε→0 sup
σ∈Σε(Φ),pi∈Πε(Φ)
Prσ,pis (Reach(W
1
1 ∪W 12 )) = 1;
lim
ε→0 sup
σ∈Σε(Φ),pi∈Πε(Φ)
Prσ,pis (Reach(W
1
1 )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s);
lim
ε→0 sup
σ∈Σε(Φ),pi∈Πε(Φ)
Prσ,pis (Reach(W
1
2 )) = 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s).
Consider a nonzero-sum reachability game GR such that the states inW 11 ∪W 12 are transformed to absorbing states and
the objectives of both players are reachability objectives: the objective for player 1 is Reach(W 11 ) and the objective
for player 2 is Reach(W 12 ). Note that the game GR is not zero-sum in the following sense: there are infinite paths ω
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such that ω 6∈ Reach(W 11 ) and ω 6∈ Reach(W 12 ) and each player gets a payoff 0 for the path ω. We define ε-Nash
equilibrium of the game GR and relate some special ε-Nash equilibrium of GR with the values of G.
Definition 5 (ε-Nash Equilibrium in GR). A strategy profile (σ ∗, pi∗) ∈ Σ ×Π is an ε-Nash equilibrium at state s if
the following two conditions hold:
Prσ
∗,pi∗
s (Reach(W
1
1 )) ≥ sup
σ∈Σ
Prσ,pi
∗
s (Reach(W
1
1 ))− ε
Prσ
∗,pi∗
s (Reach(W
1
2 )) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
Prσ
∗,pi
s (Reach(W
1
2 ))− ε. 
Theorem 4 (Nash Equilibrium of Reachability Game GR). The following assertion holds for the game GR .
• For all ε > 0, there is an ε-Nash equilibrium (σ ∗ε , pi∗ε ) ∈ Σε(Φ)×Πε(Φ) such that for all states s we have
lim
ε→0Pr
σ ∗ε ,pi∗ε
s (Reach(W
1
1 )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)
lim
ε→0Pr
σ ∗ε ,pi∗ε
s (Reach(W
1
2 )) = 〈〈2〉〉val(Φ)(s).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4. 
Note that in case of MDPs the strategy for player 2 is trivial, i.e., player 2 has only one strategy. Hence in context of
MDPs we drop the strategy pi of player 2. A specialization of Theorem 4 in case of MDPs yields Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. For all MDPs G, for all tail objectives Φ, we have
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = sup
σ∈Σ
Prσs (Reach(W
1
1 )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(W 11 ))(s).
Since the values in MDPs with reachability objectives can be computed in polynomial time (by linear
programming) [3,9], our result presents a polynomial time reduction of quantitative analysis of tail objectives in
MDPs to qualitative analysis.
5. Construction of ε-optimal strategies for Muller objectives
In this section we show that for Muller objectives witnesses of ε-optimal strategies can be constructed as witnesses
of certain limit-sure winning strategies that respect certain local conditions. A key notion that will play an important
role in the construction of ε-optimal strategies is the notion of local optimality. Informally, a selector function ξ is
locally optimal if it is optimal in the one-step matrix game where each state is assigned a reward value 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s).
A locally optimal strategy is a strategy that consists of locally optimal selectors. A locally ε-optimal strategy is a
strategy that has a total deviation from locally optimal selectors of at most ε. We note that local ε-optimality and
ε-optimality are very different notions. Local ε-optimality consists in the approximation of local optimal selectors; a
locally ε-optimal strategy provides no guarantee of yielding a probability of winning the game close to the optimal
one.
Definition 6 (Locally ε-Optimal Selectors and Strategies). A selector ξ is locally optimal for objective Φ if for all
s ∈ S and a2 ∈ Mv2(s) we have
Eξ(s),a2s [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θ1)] ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s).
We denote by Λ`(Φ) the set of locally optimal selectors for objectiveΦ. A strategy σ is locally optimal for objectiveΦ
if for every history 〈s0, s1, . . . , sk〉 we have σ(〈s0, s1, . . . , sk〉) ∈ Λ`(Φ), i.e., player 1 plays a locally optimal selector
at every round of the play. We denote by Σ `(Φ) the set of locally optimal strategies for objective Φ. A strategy σε is
locally ε-optimal for objective Φ if for every strategy pi ∈ Π , for all k ≥ 1, for all states s we have
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)− Eσ,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)] ≤ ε.
Observe that a strategy that at each round i chooses a locally optimal selector with probability at least (1 − εi ), with∑∞
i=0 εi ≤ ε, is a locally ε-optimal strategy. We denote by Σ `ε (Φ) the set of locally ε-optimal strategies for objective
Φ. 
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We first show that for all tail objectives, for all ε > 0, there exist strategies that are ε-optimal and locally ε-optimal as
well.
Lemma 5. For all tail objectives Φ, for all ε > 0,
1.Σ ε
2
(Φ) ⊆ Σ `ε (Φ),
2.Σε(Φ) ∩ Σ `ε (Φ) 6= ∅.
Proof. For ε > 0, fix an ε2 -optimal strategy σ for player 1. By definition σ is an ε-optimal strategy as well. We argue
that σ ∈ Σ `ε (Φ). Assume towards contradiction that σ 6∈ Σ `ε (Φ), i.e., there exists a player 2 strategy pi , a state s, and
k such that
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)− Eσ,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)] > ε.
Fix a strategy pi∗ = (pi + p˜i) for player 2 as follows: play pi for k steps, then switch to an ε4 -optimal strategy p˜i .
Formally, for a history 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉 we have
pi∗(〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) =

pi(〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉) if n ≤ k
p˜i(〈sk+1, sk+2, . . . , sn〉) if n > k,
where p˜i is an ε4 -optimal strategy.
Since Φ is a tail objective, we have Prσ,pi
∗
s (Φ) =
∑
t∈S Pr
σ,p˜i
t (Φ) · Prσ,pi∗s (Θk = t). Hence we obtain the following
inequality
Prσ,pi
∗
s (Φ) =
∑
t∈S
Prσ,p˜it (Φ) · Prσ,pi
∗
s (Θk = t)
=
∑
t∈S
Prσ,p˜it (Φ) · Prσ,pis (Θk = t)
≤
∑
t∈S
(
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(t)+ ε4
)
· Prσ,pis (Θk = t)
(
since p˜i is an
ε
4
-optimal strategy
)
= Eσ,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)] +
ε
4
.
Hence we have
Prσ,pi
∗
s (Φ) < (〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)− ε)+
ε
4
= 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)− 3ε4 < 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)−
ε
2
.
Since by assumption σ is an ε2 -optimal strategy we have a contradiction. This establishes the desired result. 
Definition 7 (Perennial ε-Optimal Strategies). A strategy σ is a perennial ε-optimal strategy for objective Φ, if it
is ε-optimal for all states s, and for all histories 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉, for all strategies pi ∈ Π for player 2, Prσ,pis (Φ |
〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(sk) − ε. In other words, for every history 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉, given the history the
probability to satisfy Φ is within ε of the value at sk . We denote by ΣPLε (Φ) the set of perennial ε-optimal strategies
for player 1, for objective Φ. The set of perennial ε-optimal strategies for player 2 is defined similarly and we denote
them by Π PLε (Φ). 
Existence of perennial ε-optimal strategies. The results of [7] proves existence of perennial ε-optimal strategies for
concurrent games with parity objectives, for all ε > 0. Since Muller objectives can be reduced to parity objectives,
the following proposition follows.
Proposition 4. For all concurrent game structures, for all Muller objectives Φ, for all ε > 0, ΣPLε (Φ) 6= ∅ and
Π PLε (Φ) 6= ∅.
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Lemma 6. For all concurrent game structures G, for all Muller objectives Φ for player 1 and Φ for player 2, we have
inf
σ∈ΣPLε (Φ)
sup
pi∈Π
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) = 0;
inf
σ∈Σε(Φ)
sup
pi∈Π
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) = 0;
inf
pi∈Π PLε (Φ)
sup
σ∈Σ
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) = 0;
inf
pi∈Πε(Φ)
sup
σ∈Σ
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) = 0.
Proof. We show that
inf
σ∈ΣPLε (Φ)
sup
pi∈Π
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) = 0.
Since for all ε > 0 we haveΣPLε (Φ) ⊆ Σε(Φ), this is sufficient to prove the first two claims. The results for the last two
claims are symmetric. We prove the first claim as follows. Let W>0 = W>01 ∩W>02 . Let η = mins∈W>0〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s),
and observe that 0 < η < 1. Fix 0 < 2ε < η, and fix a perennial ε-optimal strategy σ ∈ ΣPLε (Φ). Consider a
strategy pi ∈ Π for player 2. Since σ ∈ ΣPLε (Φ), for all k ≥ 1, for all histories 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉 such that si ∈ W>0
for all i ≤ k, we have Prσ,pis (Φ | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉) ≥ η − ε > η2 . For a history 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉 such that there exists
i ≤ k and si 6∈ W>0 we have Prσ,pis (Reach(W 11 ∪ W 12 ) | 〈s1, s2, . . . , sk〉) = 1. Hence it follows that for all n we have
Prσ,pis (Φ ∪ Reach(W 11 ∪ W 12 ) | Fn) > η2 . Since η2 > 0, by Lemma 3 we have Prσ,pis (Φ ∪ Reach(W 11 ∪ W 12 )) = 1, i.e.,
Prσ,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>0)) = 0. The desired result follows. 
Theorem 6. Given a concurrent game structure G, with a tail objective Φ for player 1. Let σε ∈ Σ `ε (Φ) be a locally
ε-optimal strategy, and ε-optimal from W 11 (i.e., for all s ∈ W 11 and for all strategies pi we have Prσε,pis (Φ) ≥ 1− ε).
If for all strategies pi for player 2 we have Prσε,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 )) ≤ ε, then σε is an 3ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. Let η1 = maxs∈W>02 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s). Without loss of generality we assume that the states in W
1
2 are converted
to absorbing states and player 2 wins if the play reaches W 12 . Consider an arbitrary strategy pi for player 2, and
consider a state s ∈ W>01 ∩ W>02 . Let α = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s). By local ε-optimality of σε, for all k ≥ 1, we have
α − ε ≤ Eσε,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)]. Since for all s ∈ S we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) ≤ 1, we have Eσε,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)] ≤
Prσε,pis (Θk ∈ W>01 ). Hence we obtain the following inequality:
α − ε ≤ Eσε,pis [〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(Θk)] ≤ Prσε,pis (Θk ∈ W>01 )
≤ Prσε,pis (Safe(W>01 )) = 1− Prσε,pis (Reach(W 12 )).
Hence we have Prσε,pis (Reach(W 12 )) ≤ 1− α+ ε. Thus we obtain that Prσε,pis (Φ ∩Reach(W 12 )) ≤ 1− α+ ε. Since σε
is ε-optimal from W 11 , we have Pr
σε,pi
s (Φ ∩ Reach(W 11 )) ≤ ε. The above inequalities and along with the assumption
of the lemma yield the following inequality:
Prσε,pis (Φ) = Prσε,pis (Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩W>02 ))+ Prσε,pis (Φ ∩ Reach(W 12 ))+ Prσε,pis (Φ ∩ Reach(W 11 ))
≤ ε + 1− α + ε + ε ≤ 1− α + 3ε.
Thus Prσε,pis (Φ) ≥ α − 3ε. Since the above inequality holds for all pi we obtain that σε is an 3ε-optimal strategy. 
Lemma 6 shows that the ε-optimal strategies for player 1 are limit-sure winning against objective Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩
W>02 ), for Muller objectives Φ. Theorem 6 shows that if a strategy is ε-limit-sure winning for player 1 against
objective Φ ∩ Safe(W>01 ∩ W>02 ) for player 2, then local ε-optimality guarantees 3ε-optimality. This characterizes
ε-optimal strategies as local ε-optimal and ε-limit-sure winning strategies. We believe our results would be useful
in the quantitative analysis of concurrent games with Muller objectives. Results similar to Lemma 6 and Theorem 6
along with the qualitative analysis for concurrent parity games lead to improved complexity results for quantitative
analysis of concurrent parity games. Similarly the qualitative analysis of concurrent Muller games along with our
results could lead to improve complexity results for quantitative analysis of concurrent Muller games.
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6. Conclusion
In this work we studied concurrent games with tail objectives. We proved the positive limit-one property and
also related the values of zero-sum tail games with Nash equilibria of nonzero-sum reachability games. We also
presented construction of ε-optimal strategies for Muller objectives. The computation of the sets W 11 ,W
>0
1 and the
corresponding sets for player 2 for concurrent games and its subclasses for tail objectives remain open. The more
general problem of computing the value functions also remain open. We believe that algorithms for computing
W 11 ,W
>0
1 and the properties we prove in the paper could lead to algorithms for computing value functions. The
exact characterization of tail objectives in the Borel hierarchy also remains open.
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